Steadfastness as a Working Rational Strategy

Many of us have come to believe that the idea of the liberation
of Palestine or of steadfastness (somoud) in the face of Zionism
is excess political baggage from the bygone fifties and sixties.
Many of us now believe that these are slogans, perhaps poetry,
that doesn't effectively tackle the hard questions posed by current
political reality. A careful analysis of the concept of steadfastness
however may prove that it still could be an effective, even indispensable
strategy in achieving our political goals in the coming century.

This conclusion emanates from a cold, hard, objective look at the
role of steadfastness in winning wars.

In the Napoleonic wars and for several decades afterwards,
conventional military wisdom dictated that one first bombard
enemy lines heavily with cannon balls, then proceed in coordinated
waves to finish off remaining pockets of enemy resistance with
rifles and bayonets.

With the advent of the assembly line in industry and the invention
of machine guns that could fire several rounds of bullets, little
pockets of enemy resistance that survived the aftermath of heavy
bombardment could mow down wave after wave of advancing troops.
This meant that the advantage moved from the offense to the defense.
World War I, therefore, was a war of stalemates. Defenders who went
on the offensive after thinking that they had taught the enemy a
lesson found themselves being taught a similar lesson as victims
of the savage carnage of machine gun warfare.

As civilian industry became more capital-intensive, the Germans
handled this problem in World War II by introducing the tank onto
the battlefield and by developing the concept of Blitzkrieg. In
Blitzkrieg strategy, massive bombardment a la the Napoleonic wars
would be concentrated on a small section of a well-fortified defense
line (like the famous line of Magineaux), after which tanks would
plow (Blitzkrieg) through that particular section. Infantry troops
then could walk safely behind these moving steel fortifications,
protected from hostile machine gun fire. Once that initial
penetration was achieved, defending troops on other parts of the
defense line would be surrounded, after which they would have no
other choice but to try to negotiate a surrender. The collapse of
their seemingly impenetrable defense line would lead them to conclude
that it would be wisest to preserve their lives by fleeing or giving
up.

The Soviets were the first to deflate the effectiveness of the German
Blitzkrieg as a strategic weapon in World War II. After the initial
penetration unto Soviet lines is made, and it always does when you
concentrate such large forces on only a tiny section of the long
defense line, the Soviet commanders would order every Red Army group
on the other parts of the defense line, surrounded or not, intact and
refurbished with supplies or not, to hold down their positions
STEADFASTLY to the last fighter regardless of what is happening else
where. No surrender. No treaty. No retreat under any circumstances.
Just fight on behind your line so it may become the base for a
counter-offensive in the future or at least to prevent further
advancement by the Germans from opening up loopholes elsewhere.
The legendary steadfastness of Stalingrad was the product of this
rational choice.

This was NOT conventional military wisdom at the time though. To
keep on fighting after the collapse of your overall defense line
and plan due to a Blitzkrieg or an encirclement was deemed by
contemporary military strategists a form of deadly stubborn vanity,
emotional at best. But the Soviets called it STEADFASTNESS. And this
is not poetry or sloganeering, even though it surely sounds pretty
to a Palestinian ear.

Steadfastness WORKED as an effective tangible strategic defense
against Blitzkriegs. Of course, the Soviets also developed the
RPG, the light anti-tank rocket launcher which could be carried
and launched by a single foot soldier off the shoulder.

In fact steadfastness worked so well that the Germans adopted
it in the face of encroaching American and Soviet troops later
on. And I will not elaborate here on how German steadfastness
was eventually overcame and the dear price that was exacted
of the allies in the process. Because in the end, when there’s
a will, there’s a way.

What matters for us here and now is to know that until today, the
Blitzkrieg is still the primary “Israeli” method of offense, except
that planes are used in conjunction with cannons of the modern variety
in the preliminaries. I believe that the “Israeli” army is capable of
reaching as far as Morocco in a Blitzkrieg under aerial cover, but that
won’t mean political or military defeat for us unless we elect to give
up the rational choice of steadfastness as happened in many previous
wars with “Israel”. Note please that the political applications for
this line of thinking are endless.

Note also that the RPG is so simple to make that the PLO used to
manufacture the launcher itself back in the seventies (but not the
rocket head). SAM7’s and Stinger missiles are the aerial equivalent
of RPG’s today. Note as well that Beirut in the summer of 1982 was
a prime example of steadfastness THAT WORKS. FOR WHEN WE FIND THE
WILL TO FIGHT, WE WILL FIND A WAY TO SUCCEED as we did in South Lebanon,
or Gaza during the Intifada.

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