Your Voice in a World where Zionism, Steel, and Fire, have Turned Justice Mute

 

 

The *FREE ARAB VOICE*
November 14, 2000
In this issue of the Free Arab Voice (FAV) we present:
1) How Long Will the Intifada Last?  What Will it Accomplish? An
   Analysis of the Prospects of the Intifada By Hammad Hammad, a
   Palestinian Arab Engineer.
2) Prayer for Peace, Another Mesmerizing Poem by Nabila Harb
3) A Report on Pro-Intifada Demonstrations in Mauritania, by Mohamed
   Dogui and Ziad El-Jishi
4) The Operations of the Omar Al-Mokhtar Forces: Examples of Feasible
   Military Action in Palestine through Some of Their Communiques.  A Free
   Arab Voice Special.  Communiques 13-23
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1) How Long Will the Intifada Last?  What Will it Accomplish? 
By Hammad Hammad, a Palestinian Arab Engineer.
A few days ago, a friend posed a couple of questions as we were
discussing current events in Palestine. His questions were so simple yet
so complex.  He asked:
  1. How long do you believe the Intifada will last?
  2. What potential accomplishment does it have?
As you can see, the questions are both legitimate and to the point.  My
first instinct was to give him the standard Arab rhetorical answers; but
decided to take some time to think over questions that merit perhaps
more particular consideration.  After some reflection, I realized that
the true answers would not be comforting.
Let’s look at each of the questions separately:
 1. How long will the Intifada last?
My estimate is that unless Palestinian opposition groups act, the
Intifada has a very strong chance of dying down before it reaches the
end of its second month.  Here are the reasons:
Many Arab intellectuals opposed the “Peace Process” from the onset
because of the fundamental flaws inherent in the entire concept.  Today,
it is obvious that they were right. When there is a fundamental flaw in
any idea, it will never bear good fruit whatever the circumstances.  Is
there a fundamental flaw in this Intifada?  Sadly, there is.  The act of
uprising against the enemy in and of itself is not flawed.  Rather, it
is the political structure of the Palestinian people, and that of the
Arab people as a whole) that is flawed. The big problem here is that we
as Palestinians (just like the rest of the Arabs) have not recognized
the fact that the combination of individual leadership and a lack of
institutions to direct our national interests have been detrimental to
our efforts. We still believe in the 'hero leader' when logic tells us
that we really need a system to represent us.
No one in their right mind doubts the willingness of the Palestinian
people to sacrifice and struggle for as long as it takes until Palestine
is liberated. The actions of the Palestinian people during the Intifada
are nothing short of true heroism.  But, what good is heroism and
sacrifice if one man calls the shots and his main goal is to barter for
whatever he can get at the negotiating table? I would have preferred
seeing a Palestinian uprising against Arafat and his gang in order to
install a true national liberation movement in their place. It certainly
would have been much more effective in bringing the Palestinian people
closer to their goals.
And there is absolutely no doubt that the Intifada has a great potential
in affecting change not only at the Palestinian level, but also at the
Arab level (see article below on Mauritania). The strong demonstrations
in Jordan and Egypt and the solidarity of the Arab and Muslim People
(not governments) deeply worried the United States and the Zionists.  If
the Intifada had developed into a larger conflict, the US stood to lose
two of its major allies in the region as well as watch all of the
normalization accomplishments of the last decade turn to dust.  Along
with that, the Zionists stood to lose the image of stability they had
worked so hard to foster among Jews outside of Palestine as well as the
rest of the World. Many of the more recent Jewish immigrants/invaders
never thought that they could lose their children to a war with the
Arabs.
2. What Potential does the Intifada Have?
Unless the Palestinian opposition steps up to the plate, the Intifada
will lose its momentum soon for the following reasons:
  A. The Arafat Factor:
Arafat has crossed the point of no return where it comes to
negotiation.  He is trapped in a position where he has no cards left to
play at the negotiating table but cannot return to armed struggle.  He
already forfeited the option of armed struggle long ago.   He therefore
views the Intifada as a 'gift from God' that he can use in a new gamble.
To use that card, he will have to return to the negotiating table. In
order to return to the table, the Intifada will have to be brought to an
end.
Arafat first must show that he, and only he, is in control of the
Palestinian people and the Intifada. So how can Arafat take control of
the Intifada? Judging from his history with the Palestinian people, he
would support the Intifada at the beginning.  As a matter of fact, and
as we have seen, he would appear as one of its greatest proponents.  He,
with all of his distinction for opportunism, views a popular movement
such this as a train on a fast track. If he stands in the way and tries
to stop it, it will crush him. Instead, he will ride that train, work
his way to the control room, and then take over the controls from there.
With that in mind, it is not surprising that Arafat rode the train of
the Intifada to the extent of telling Barak to “go to hell.” And it’s
not surprising that Fatah has been one of the very active organizations
in the Intifada. Arafat's next move will be to start slowing things down
until he brings the whole train to a grinding halt, even if that means
conspiring against the more militant elements inside Fatah who are not
in the mood to return to the negotiating table.
  B.  The Oslo Accord:
 From the Zionist standpoint, the Oslo Accord and the subsequent 'peace'
agreements were designed with the Intifada in mind.  These agreements
effectively gathered the largest part of the population in the West Bank
and Gaza under small Palestinian Authority enclaves. Palestinians in
those areas therefore no longer can successfully wage an effective civil
disobedience campaign against the invader.  During the first Intifada,
confrontations took place throughout the West Bank, Gaza and the rest of
Palestine.  With the exception of demonstrations by 1948 Palestinians,
confrontations in this Intifada have been limited to a few flash points.
This helps the Zionists a great deal as effective controls do not
require as much troop deployment as they did in the past.
  C. The Palestinian Opposition:
 The failure of Palestinian opposition to move in and take the reigns of
leadership is an important factor here. Here is yet another successful
tactic for Arafat.  During any confrontation, Arafat always has sought
to bring the Opposition under his wing in the name of national (or
patriotic) unity.  But the truth is that any time Arafat and his men ask
you to coordinate with them, you should run fast and run far.  What they
are really saying is that they want to control you. Opposition groups
including Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have fallen into that trap many
times and have fallen victim to it again this time by agreeing to
coordinate with Fatah and other token opposition groups.  Token
opposition groups such as the PFLP and DFLP can flip-flop positions
anytime without having to commit to either side, which only serves to
strengthen Arafat’s position of course.  The opposition groups
originally took the lead in this Intifada.  Instead of coordinating at
the highest political levels, they should have let other groups follow
their lead in the field if they wish, without surrendering an iota of
their political decision-making.
  D. The Tactical Facts
Probably the biggest factor of all is that you cannot achieve anything
when you are losing resources and your enemy is barely losing any.  It
pains me when to hear of Palestinian deaths, and I get ecstatic when I
hear news of Zionist casualties.  Unfortunately, the balance has been
heavily tipped in favor of the Zionists.  Some might say that the
Intifada takes an enormous toll on the Zionist image in the World.  It
may come as a shock to many to realize that the world actually does not
care.  Enough already.
  E. The Arab Regimes:
The Intifada has generated a lot of anxiety for Arab regimes.  Popular
response from the Arab Street has been overwhelming and caused a great
deal of trouble for those friendly riot control troops. From the
viewpoint of Arab governments, the Intifada must not be allowed to
continue, much less escalate, for it will either endanger their position
or force them to take measures that may anger the US. Already they have
had to meet in a summit, from which even Iraq could not be excluded.
  What would change the dismal scenario? Two factors come to mind:
  1. The Opposition: How the real Palestinian opposition behaves will be
a determining factor here. If they respond with effective military
action against the Zionists, there will be a very good chance for the
Intifada to continue. The Zionists historically overreact to military
operations and loss of life on their side.  They have been selling their
constituents on the idea that Arafat is responsible for the Intifada and
that they will have to respond with force or else they will lose
political ground.   A Zionist   overreaction to military operations will
only fuel the Intifada.  On the other hand, if the opposition tows the
line the PFLP and DFLP and does nothing but issue fiery communiqués, it
will fail miserably.
  2. Arafat dying: If Arafat dies suddenly, he will leave room for a
leadership loyal to the Palestinian cause to fill the gap.  Part of
Arafat's strength in controlling the Palestinian public lies in his
longevity in leadership.  There are a lot of Palestinians (albeit
uninformed) who still view him as the “father figure” who knows best for
his sons.  I know it is a naive and foolish view but one has to take
into consideration the factor of paternal leadership in the cultural
background of the Arab people.  To solidify his reigns over the
Palestinian people, Arafat has surrounded himself with a junta of
opportunists and incompetents, none of whom could pass as a leader.  So
the issue of who will be heir to Arafat has been  important not only to
Palestinians, but also to the Zionists and the West.  The only viable
heirs are among who oppose him.
Will the opposition groups step in and do what needs to be done here?
That remains to be seen.  The Islamic Jihad has exhibited a greater
eagerness recently in conducting operations as part of the activities of
the Intifada.  Hamas, on the other hand, seems to be reeling from all
the hits it took from the PA in the past few years, while its leadership
sends mixed political messages that leave a lot to be desired and
coordinates with Arafat.  As for the opposition groups based in
Damascus, they  have not shown any real effectiveness as of yet, with
the exception of serious efforts that need to assume a greater scale by
the Forces of Omar Al Mokhtar.  But it seems that while the Foreces of
Omar Al Mokhtar have a very good showing in recent military action, they
do not yet have enough presence in the media. It may help them to
remember that Hizbollah did not videotape their operations for fun.
While they decimated Zionist moral, the videos helped establish
Hizbollah's leadership role in the resistance.
What will the Intifada accomplish? If Arafat is successful, the Intifada
will accomplish very little.  Those who think that the Intifada will win
Jerusalem on the bargaining table are either deceiving themselves or
deceiving others.   On the other hand, if the opposition takes the
initiative and plays a more effective and aggressive role, the Intifada
will be a great step on the road of liberation for Palestine and the
Arab World as a whole.
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2) Prayer for Peace, A Poem by Nabila Harb:
 I pray for Peace:
 Now a whore
 Servicing the client
         with the biggest bankroll.
 I pray for Peace:
 A slut, on her knees,
 Servicing the one
            with the biggest gun.
 I  pray for Peace,
 To be redeemed.
 Let her reject
 The cheats, killers and cowards
          Hiding behind her ample skirts.
 Let Peace take up the torch
 And light the fire
 Of resistance,
 The cleansing conflagration
 To consume corruption
 And reduce shame to ashes.
 Let Peace
 Enter the fire...
 As the tyres burn in the streets,
 And the smoke sends a non-negotiable signal
 To the world.
 Let the old Peace burn...
 I pray for Peace
 To be reborn in purity
 In the arms of Revolution.
 I pray for Peace,
 To become worthy
 Once more,
 To sit in honour
 With Justice and Truth.
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3) A Report on Pro-Intifada Demonstrations in Mauritania, by Mohamed
   Dogui and Ziad El-Jishi
In Teyaret-arret bis, 55yr old Mrs. Aminetou Mint Eleyat gave her life
last Saturday November 4th during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in
support of the Intifadah.  In Nwakshot, the demonstrators called for
severing relations with the Zionist enemy and protested against the
banning of the opposition party, the Union of Democratic Forces-New Era,
a coalition of opposition groups.  Mrs. Aminetou died of asphyxiation
from tear-gas thrown onto the demonstrators as they clashed with the
police.  The demonstrators came from four schools in the northern
suburbs and the center of Nwakshot, the capital.
Protesters were clubbed and tear-gassed by the policemen of Moauya  Ould
Sid Ahmad Taya, the Mauritania regime head.  The Union of Democratic
Forces-New Era was banned on the 28th of October 2000 by Taya after the
Union managed to draw some 15,000 protesters in a demonstration that
took place in Nouadhibou, 350 kilometers north of Nwakshot, the
capital.  This latest assault on the will of the Mauritanian people, and
the blatant repression of political expression including jailings and
beatings, comes one year to the month since Taya established diplomatic
relations with the Zionist enemy in October 1999.
The Union of Democratic Forces-New Era along with the people of our
steadfast castle of Arab Mauritania have been continuously resisting
this cowardly capitulation and have called for the immediate cutting of
relations with the Zionist enemy.   The government of Mauritania
retaliated, however, by beating the people with batons, tear-gassing
them, and outlawing the Union of Democratic Forces, the main opposition
group.
In keeping with its strategy of stifling freedom of expression and
oppressing the brave cadre and masses of the Mauritanian people, the
Taya regime attacked the Union of Democratic Forces after it raised
questions on the “disappearances" of opposition figures in the late 80's
and 90's.  This persisted with the arrest of the Union's general
secretary on April 24th 2000, followed by his release without charge on
April 29th, after massive international pressure.
Of recent, members of the banned Union such as Cheikh Ould Sidaty,
Mohamed Ould Rabah, and Mohamed Ould Molud have been arbitrarily
arrested by the regime. They were taken to the State Security
Headquarters for interrogation and then released.
This reveals once more the true face of the Arab regimes that beat and
arrest the people of the Arab World, act as the true protectors of the
Zionist enemy and imperialism, and thus help to preserve Zionist
colonization in Palestine and their own stronghold on power.
The Arab masses have taken to the streets and have spoken loud and
clear.  But as we have seen in Jordan, Egypt, and some other Arab
countries, the police continues to conspire with their clients amongst
the masses to abort demonstrations and confuse the people, and to use
various ruthless methods, including brutal beatings, arrests, and in
some cases outright killings with tear-gas or bullets.   Understandably,
Arab regimes are afraid of a world without Zionism because this would
mean a world without their oppression an inglorious reign.  What they do
not understand, however, is that the will of the people is always
victorious and that the thrones of their oppressive Arab regimes are
shaking and will collapse none too soon.
The Palestinian Intifadah has already triumphed, in the sense that it
has burgeoned into an Arab intifadah.
That trio of enemies of the Arab people: Zionism, imperialism, and
Arab reaction should beware!
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4) The Operations of the Omar Al-Mokhtar Forces: Examples of Feasible
   Military Action in Palestine through Some of Their Communiques.
   A Free Arab Voice Special
[For communiqués No. 1-12, please go to:
http://www.fav.net/feasibleMilitaryActionInPalestine.htm
Communique No. 13
October 31, 2000
1. One of our groups lured a Zionist military patrol from Karni (the
colony of Netsarim) into an ambush in Mansurah, where the patrol was
greeted with machine gun fire.  This resulted in confirmed hits among
Zionists.
2. On the eve of Tuesday, October 31, our Forces blew up a highly
explosive charge as a Zionist convoy went by, then sprayed the invader
with machine gun fire.
Communique No. 14
November 2, 2000
1. On the eve of Wednesday, November 1, one of our groups blew up a
highly explosive charge reinforced with hand grenades as a Zionist
convoy passed by the exit of the colony of Netsarim near Gaza.  Our
fighters followed up with machine gun fire.
2. One of our heroes hurled a hand grenade at a Zionist barricade near
the colony of Kissuvim, south of the Gaza Strip.
Communique No. 15
November 2, 2000
On the eve of Wednesday, November 1, one of our fighting groups laid an
ambush to a Zionist convoy on a road by the sea near a military
checkpoint in the region of the colony of Nitser Hazani, near the Arab
town of Khan Younis.
Once the convoy fell into the predetermined coordinates, our fighters
attacked simultaneously with machine gun fire and hand grenades.
The invader admitted to having suffered casualties, including one dead
officer and four injured men.  These were hauled away in ambulances to
the colony of Ghosh Qatif.
Communique No. 16
November 4, 2000
On the eve of Saturday, November 4, one of our groups attacked a Zionist
patrol on the road stretching between the colonies of Miraj and Ghosh
Qatif in the Khan Younis region, south of the Gaza Strip.  Our fighters
hurled an explosive charge at the patrol, while targeting the patrol and
the Zionist checkpoint nearby simultaneously with machine gun fire.
The invader admitted the occurrence of the daring operation through
media.
Communique No. 17
November 6, ?2000
On the morning of Monday, November 6, our fighters detonated a highly
explosive charge as a Zionist patrol passed by near one of the colonies
of Ghosh Qatif, and followed up with machine gun fire and hand
grenades.  The invader admitted to the occurrence of the operation.
Communique No. 18
November 7, 2000
1. On the morning of Tuesday, November 7, one of our groups attacked a
Zionist patrol with machine gun fire on the boulevard connecting the
West Bank towns of Qalqilyah and Toulkarem, between the colonies of Eyal
and Tsouranatan.  The invader admitted to the occurrence of the daring
operation.
2. In the afternoon of Tuesday, November 7, another of our groups
attacked a Zionist patrol escorting a horde of Zionist settlers with
machine guns and hand grenades on the road leading to the colony of Kfar
Daroum, south of the town of Dair El Balah.  The invader admitted to the
occurrence of the operation.
Communique No. 19
November 8, 2000
On the morning of Wednesday, November 8, one of our groups attacked a
car at the exit of Rafah, south of the Gaza Strip, that was carrying a
number of Zionist security personnel who work at a checkpoint on the
border crossing between Egypt and Palestine.  Our fighters confirmed
that every Zionist in the car has gone to hell, but Zionist radio
claimed that only one settler has gone to hell, while another suffered
injuries and has gone to the hospital.
Communique No. 20
November 10, 2000
On the eve of Friday, November 10, one of our groups detonated an
explosive charge as a Zionist patrol passed by on the road to the
colonies of Ghosh Qatif in the Khan Younis region.  Our fighters then
creamed the patrol with machine gun fire and hand grenades.
Communique No. 21
November 11, 2000
In the afternoon of Saturday, November 11, one of our groups riddled a
Zionist checkpoint on the bridge near Ghosh Qatif in Khan Younis with
machine gun fire.   The invader admitted to the operation.
Communique No. 22
November 12, 2000
On the morning of Sunday, November 12, one of our groups detonated
several highly explosive charges as a Zionist patrol went by on the road
connecting the colonies of Kfar Daroum and Ghosh Qatif in the Khan
Younis region, south of the Gaza Strip.  Our fighters then followed up
with hand grenades and machine gun fire.  Several enemy vehicles were
damaged as a result, and several hits were scored.  The invader admitted
to the occurrence of the operation.
Communique No. 23 [Just In!]
November 13, 2000
On the eve of Monday, November 13, one of our groups creamed a Zionist
patrol that was passing by the military point of Kissuvim, south of the
Gaza Strip, with machine gun fire and hand grenades.  The invader
admitted to the occurrence of the daring strike and to having suffered
several hits between dead and wounded.
OMAR AL MOKHTAR FORCES
Long live Palestine Free and Arab.
Glory and immortality to the faithful martyrs of our people and nation.
We pledge to continue with the revolution and the resistance until the
Zionist enemy is defeated, and until Palestine, all of Palestine, is
liberated.
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