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The Zionist conspiracy to divide the Arab states into small units


July 22, 2000
In 1982 the Hebrew-language magazine Kivunim (Directions), the
official organ of the World Zionist Organization published an
important article entitled, "A Strategy for Israel in the
Nineteen Eighties". The Editor of Kivunim is Yoram Beck,
Head of Publications, Department of Information, of the
World Zionist Organization. Also on the Editorial Committee
of Kivunim is Amnon Hadary, a member of the Palmach during
the 1948 atrocities. Israel Shahak, professor of organic
chemistry at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and chairman
of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights translated the
article into English and wrote the following foreword to it. It
was published in 1982 as a pamphlet by the Association of
Arab-American University graduates. Professor Shahak states:
The following essay represents, in my opinion, the accurate and
detailed plan of the present Zionist regime for the Middle East
which is based on the division of the whole area into small states,
and the dissolution of all the existing Arab states. I will comment
on the military aspect of this plan in a concluding note.

Here I want to draw the attention of the readers to several
important points:
1 . The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down,
    by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in
    Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze'ev Schiff,
    the military correspondent of Ha'aretz (and probably the
    most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about
    the best that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq :
    "The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite state, a Sunni
     state and the separation of the Kurdish part" (Ha'aretz,
     2/6/1982). Actually this aspect of the plan is very old.
2.  The strong connection with neo-Conservative thought in the
    USA is very prominent, especially in the author's notes.
    But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the defense
    of the West from Soviet power, the real aim of the author,
    and of the present Israeli establishment is clear: To make
    an imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the
    aim of Sharon is to deceive the Americans after be has
    deceived all the rest.
3.  It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the
    notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the
    financial help of the US to Israel. Much of it is pure
    fantasy. But, the plan is not to be regarded as not
    influential or as not capable of realization for a short
    time. The plan follows faithfully the geopolitical ideas
    current in Germany of 1890-1933, which were swallowed whole
    by Hitler and the Nazi movement, and determined their aims
    for East Europe. Those aims, especially the division of the
    existing states, were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an
    alliance on the global scale prevented their consolidation
    for a period of time.
Israel Shahak Kivunim's plan states that all the Arab states are
fragmented as follows:
"The Arab Muslim world, therefore, is not the major strategic
 problem which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact
 that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its
 growing military might. This world, with its ethnic minorities,
 its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly
 self-destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran
 and now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its
 fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a real
 threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but only
 in the short run where its immediate military power has great
 import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist
 within its present framework in the areas around us without
 having to go through genuine revolutionary changes. The Moslem
 Arab World is built like a temporary house of cards put together
 by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties),
 without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been
 taken into account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19 states,
 all made of combinations of minorities and ethnic groups which
 are hostile to one another, so that every Arab Moslem state
 nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in
 some a civil war is already raging. Most of the Arabs, ll8
 million out of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt
 (45 million today).
Maghreb States:
Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a
mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is
already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between
the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at
war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the
internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers
the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which
are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country
which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful
nation. That is why he has been attempting unifications in the
past with states that are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria.
Sudan, the most torn apart state in the Arab Moslem world
today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an
Arab Muslim Sunni minority which rules over majority of
non-Arab Africans, Pagans and Christians.
In Egypt there is a Sunni Muslim majority facing a large
minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt:
some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech
on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state
of their own. something like a second Christian Lebanon
in Egypt.
All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken
up and riddled with inner conflict even more than those of
the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon
except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the
real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority
and the Shi'ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12 % of the
population) testifies to the severity of the domestic trouble.
Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors,
although its majority is Shi'ite and the ruling minority Sunni.
Sixty-five percent of the population has no say in politics,
in which an elite of 20 percent holds the power. In addition
there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it
weren't for the strength of the ruling regime, the army and
the oil revenues, Iraq's future state would be no different
than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today. The seeds
of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today already,
especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a
leader whom the Shi'ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and North Yemen:
All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a
delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait,
the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In
Bahrain, the Shi'ites are the majority but are deprived of
power. In the United Arab Emirates, Shi'ites are once again
the majority but the Sunnis are in power. The same is true
of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen
there is a sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half
the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi
minority holds power.
Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a TransJordanian
Bedouin minority, but most of the army and certainly the
bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman
is as Palestinian as Nablus.
All of these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking.
But there is a problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly
Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi'ite with Sunni
commanders. This has great significance in the long run, and that is
why it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a
long time except where it comes to the only common denominator:
the hostility towards Israel, and today even that is insufficient."
Israel's plan by Kivunim:
"A sad and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates
challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching
opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that
opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in the
Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even
imagine today. The peace policy and the return of territories,
through a dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of
the new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments
of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow political
needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive opinions
at home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad.
Failing to take steps towards the Arab population in the new
territories, acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is
the major strategic error committed by Israel on the morning
after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all the
bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan
to the Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing
that we would have neutralized the Palestinian problem which we
nowadays face, and to which we have found solutions that are
really no solutions at all, such as territorial compromise or
autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing. Today we
suddenly face immense opportunities for transforming the
situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade
otherwise we shall not survive as a state."
"Regaining the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential
resources is therefore a political priority which is obstructed
by the Camp David and the peace agreements. The fault for that
lies of course with the present Israeli government and the
governments which paved the road to the policy of territorial
compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians
will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the
Sinai and they will do all they can to return to the fold of
the Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and
military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a short
while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the US
both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid.
Without oil and the income from it, with the present enormous
expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under the
present conditions and we will have to act in order to return
the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior
to Sadat's visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with
him in March 1979.
Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today,
nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and
politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take
the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short
history. What is left, therefore, is the indirect option. The
economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its
pan-Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982
in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in
order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and
energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a
military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it
could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no more
than one day."
Israel's plans to fragment the Arab States are outlined
Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is already
a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing
Muslim-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into
distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel
in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority.
If Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the
more distant states will not continue to exist in their present
form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The
vision of a Christian Coptic State in upper Egypt alongside a
number of weak states with very localized power and without a
centralized movement as to date, is the key to a historical
development which was only set back by the peace agreement but
which seems inevitable in the long run.
Lebanon's total dissolution into five provinces serves as a
precedent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria,
Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that
track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically
or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary
target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution
of the military power of those states serves as the primary short
term target.
Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic religious
structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon
so that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its coast,
a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus
hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a
state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in
northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for
peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is
already within our reach today.
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the
other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's targets. Its
dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria.
Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power
which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian
war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before
it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us.
Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short
run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking
up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq,
a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria
during Ottoman times is possible.
So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major
cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in the
south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is
possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will
deepen this polarization.
Saudi Arabia:
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for
dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and
the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia.
Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil
remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run,
the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural
development in light of the present political structure.
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short
run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real
threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination
of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power
to the Palestinians in the short run. There is no chance that
Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a
long time, and Israelīs policy, both in war and in peace,
ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the
present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian
majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also
cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely
populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or under
conditions of peace, emigration from the territories and economic
demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the coming
change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be active in
order to accelerate this process in the nearest future. The
autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any compromise
or division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and
those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa'amr plan of
September 1980, it is not possible to go on living in this
country in the present situation without separating the two
nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west
of the river.
Genuine co-existence and peace will reign over the land only
when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between
the Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence nor
security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs
only in Jordan.
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of '67 and
the territories beyond them, those of ī48, has always been
meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any
significance for us. The problem should be seen in its
entirety without any divisions as of '67. It should be clear,
under any future political situation or military constellation,
that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will
come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure
borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our existential
need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall
soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three-fourths
of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so
dangerous in a nuclear epoch. Dispersal of the population is
therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order;
otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders.
Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for
national existence, and if we do not become the majority
in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and
we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which
was not theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to
begin with.
Rebalancing the country demographically, strategically and
economically is the highest and most central aim today.
Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to
the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the
major strategic consideration which is settling the
mountainous part of the country that is empty of Jews




FAV Editor: Ibrahim Alloush
Co-editors: Nabila Harb
  Muhammad Abu Nasr
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