The *FREE ARAB VOICE*
August 5, 1998

In this issue of the Free Arab Voice (FAV) we present:

1) On the Eighth Year of Sanctions against Iraq, the War is Not
   Over Yet: A Brief Comment by the Free Arab Voice

2) SURVIVING OSLO: POLITICAL IMPERATIVES FACING THE PALESTINIAN 

   NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE by Lara Drake. Dr.  
   Drake is a political and strategic affairs consultant based in 
   Washington and the Middle East.  The following article is based  
   on a speech she gave in London University's School 
   of Oriental and African Studies upon her return from a visit  
   earlier this year to Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza.

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1) On the Eighth Anniversary of Sanctions against Iraq:

After Eight years of sanctions against Iraq, one has to wonder WHY the
sanctions are still allowed to KILL so many innocents without reign!!  

If the excuse for the continuation of the sanctions is that Iraq went
into Kuwait, let's not forget that Iraq has left Kuwait several years
ago!!

If the excuse for the continuation of the sanctions is that Iraq
allegedly has weapons of mass-destruction, let's not forget that
"Israel" has nuclear weapons, and that nobody reproaches "Israel"!! 
The U.N. turns a blind eye, while the U.S. government continues to
arm, encourage, and defend "Israel"...

On the Eighth anniversary of the continuation of the murder, the truth
is now coming through loud and clear for those who initially bought
into the "excuses" of the Zionist-controlled media:  Iraqis continue
to be killed for purely political and racist reasons.  Arabs are not
allowed to build, to unite, to do, to be, or to have pride.  The
colonial objective is to destroy all of Iraq's elements of strength
regardless of the identity of the rulers.  As far as the Zionists or
the U.S. government are concerned, no Arab country is allowed to have
the industrial, technological, or military base that Iraq once had. 
That's the bottom line.  As Arabs we should stay weak, backward,
divided, and ruled by western puppets, so the Zionist-controlled media
can continue to facetiously complain about fundamentalism and
dictatorships in the "Middle East".

On this Eighth anniversary of the imposition of the criminal
sanctions, we salute the Iraqi people and the Iraqi leadership BECAUSE
NO OTHER PEOPLE OR LEADERSHIP COULD HAVE TAKEN ALL THIS HEAT SO
STEADFASTEDLY WITHOUT BUCKLING BEFORE THE EVIL OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER.
 In fact, the opposite is now the case.  The tide has begun to turn,
and the dying hands of Iraqi children are shredding before they leave
for good everyday this criminal charade of international legitimacy to
expose beneath the true uncivilized face of Uncle Sam before all the
free people in this world.

                                      Editor/ The Free Arab Voice
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Check out our Special Issue on Iraq
http://www.mindspring.com/~fav/special_Iraq.htm
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2) The Five Imerpatives of Palestinian Political Action 
   by Lara Drake

I- Introduction

In discussing the political imperatives facing the Palestine national
movement, it is important to start with the meaning of the term
'imperatives.' Imperatives are something above the agenda of
today or tomorrow, something larger. They are about matters of
survival, survival of the Palestinians as a people, as a political
singularity capable of speaking to the world with one voice. Such an
attribute is not inconsistent with political plurality, the multitude
of changing political trends and factions which have always existed
under the PLO framework. For it is one thing for the Palestinians to
speak to each other in a plurality of voices, but at the end of the
day, they must be capable of presenting a single voice to the world
outside.

Without this capability, the Palestinians will become the next
Armenians, the next Kurds, peoples who have been reduced to mere
ethnicities. Once the idea of the common destiny is lost, the various
segments of a former people have nothing in common except the
objective attributes, like language and religion, and maybe even a
common past, but not a common future. The primary imperative, then,
for the Palestine national movement, is to arrest the progression of
this type of fragmentation, accelerated by Oslo, to protect the
survivability of the Palestinian people, to represent them all toward
a common future.

II- The Inside-Outside Link

This means, first and foremost, restoring the severed link between
Palestinians inside Palestine, under occupation in both the 1948 and
1967 areas, and Palestinians in exile, both in the cities and refugee
camps of Arab cordon states and in faraway locations like Europe and
America. After all, the Palestinian population of close to six
million, split almost evenly between inside and outside as it is, is
an inherently dichotomous entity. But today the linkages are
faltering, due to "Israeli" strategies to cut apart the unity of the
Palestinian people by turning the knife of fragmentation at many
different angles.

"Israel" through Oslo has fragmented the inside from the outside
Palestinians by creating an objective divergence of interests between
them. After all, without the right of return, even to the unlikely
Palestinian mini-state, the outside Palestinians have no interests in
common with those inside. They have no future to hope for from Oslo
but the finality of the dissolution of their rights, their final
severance from the larger Palestinian body, and the 'solution' of
their problem as refugees in terms of individuals, scattering them one
last time to the various ends of the earth -'le akhir al-dinya,' as
they say.

For there are "Israeli" plans right now to remove the refugees from
the doors to their homeland, especially those in Lebanon, and to send
them to faraway places like Iraq, Sudan, Australia, Canada,
Scandanavia, and the United States. The "Israelis" have even used the
chairman of the international relations committee of the United States
Congress to petition the southern Gulf states of the GCC to accept
30,000 Palestinian refugees each from Lebanon, thereby
ending for them the refugee question as a political question, and
foreclosing the implementation of the Palestinian right of return as a
historical possibility once and for all. Fortunately, the target
states have refused these plans, at least for now.

This means in the first instance that the responsibility falls on the
Palestine national movement not to allow the "Israelis" to re-define
the Palestinian people in reductionist form as Camp David did, as 'the
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.' It requires focusing
more political, diplomatic, strategic and public-relations attention
on the Palestinian refugee question, restoring it as the central
problematic that it deserves to be, as one of the critical problems to
be solved in accordance with inalienable Palestinian rights, as a
question with the same historical and political weight as the
settlements or Jerusalem. 

It requires the practical act of restoring the PLO funds and services
to the refugees in Syria and Lebanon, to make up for the severe
cutbacks in contributions by UNRWA and the international charities. It
requires the Palestine national movement to energetically and
enthusiastically seek out and expose all those schemes aimed at
re-scattering the refugees outside to faraway destinations and using
all available means to combat those schemes and prevent them from
reaching fruition. It also requires that the successor or successors
to Arafat, specifically as head of the PLO (as opposed to the
Palestinian Authority), to be acceptable to the Palestinians outside
as well as inside, and that the outside half be given the chance to
participate meaningfully and actively in the succession debate.

After all, the Palestinians outside have participated equally in
Palestinian suffering as those inside, if not more so, their rights
are no less salient, and their coherence as a political force is no
less vital to the ultimate survivability of the Palestinian people as
a nation. For the Palestinian tragedy is defined just as much by exile
as it is by occupation; indeed, the very birth of the Palestinian
problem resulted in the first instance from an act of exile and only
secondarily from an act of occupation onto the emptied lands.

III- The Emigration War

Palestinians in the refugee camps outside are becoming increasingly
attracted to the prospect of emigration; this is particularly rampant
among the new generation. The cause is a variety of 'push' factors of
economic destitution and distress and lack of hope in return to
Palestine, combined with foreign 'pull' factors deliberately exerted
by "Israeli" interests in bringing about Palestinian self-dispersion.
Doors of immigration are miraculously opening in many Western
countries, complete with propaganda enticing them to leave their
temporary homes for permanent ones outside Palestine. The result has
been the gradual yet alarming de-population of the refugee camps; the
Beirut camps, for instance, have lost fully half their populations in
the last 5-10 years.

Even more startling is that the emigration scheme is being targeted by
foreign forces not only against Palestinians outside, but equally
among those inside, even in PA areas. In the Gaza Strip, for instance,
Palestinians report that the foreign advertisements encouraging
emigration from Palestine have recently been on the increase. And
there is a growing tendency on the part of these Palestinians to be
attracted to the foreign attempts to 'pull' them out, given the
disastrous economic situation imposed on the inside by the post-1993
Israeli siege operation called by the name of 'closure.' Even the most
enthusiastic former political cadres are now contemplating emigration,
not for themselves, they say, but for the sake of their children.

Exposing these foreign schemes, which can be called under the general
heading of the emigration war, and inventing strategies to counter
them, represent another urgent political imperative facing the
Palestine national movement. It requires taking political, diplomatic,
strategic, and public relations steps to counter the operational
aspects of the foreign schemes, both above and below the ground.
Failure to face this imperative will result in the gradual erosion of
the Palestinian population base and in another wave of de-population,
both from Palestine itself and from surrounding areas outside. One way
to face it is through mass education regarding the dangers of
emigration, and by providing something constructive for those
Palestinians to do other than emigrate; the leadership must give them
both the means and the hope to stay where they are, and a political
reason to do so.

IV- Contingency Planning for PA Failure

The truth is that the "Israelis" have found in Oslo a solution to
their Intifadah problem: a way to withdraw from the people without
withdrawing from the land. Today the Palestinians under occupation
cannot even see the faces of their enemies due to the physical
interpolation of PA soldiers. It is common for all people to focus on
what is right in front of their face rather than on the big picture,
and right now it is the Palestinian Authority that is right in front
of their face. However, Israel remains there as it was before,
surrounding them, imprisoning them inside their small enclosures,
preventing almost all travel to or through East Jerusalem, and
completely cutting off all movement between the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, to the point where people have begun to refer to travel between
them in the same terms as 'traveling overseas' - all this is done in
the name of peace.

Let no one imagine the West Bank is approaching statehood; if anything
it is being absorbed even more rapidly. One comparison of the reality
on the ground in the West Bank today versus three or four years ago
reveals that the West Bank is beginning to look more and more like the
colonised 1948 areas and less and less like Palestine, with the
exception of the legalisation of Palestinian national symbols in the
populated cities. Over the course of this time, the signs have been
removed from the Palestinian villages, and the Green Line, if
anything, has been erased.

This leads to the very important conclusive imperative, which is the
creation of a contingency plan in the event that the PA should fall or
be destroyed as a national force. This could happen as a result of a
multitude of factors. It could happen by virtue of an
Israeli-Palestinian war, between the Israeli army and the Palestinian
police, the so-called 'Intifadah with weapons.' It could happen as a
result of a crisis of succession, in the midst of which the PA is so
weakened that Israel is able to find a leader or leaders who will do
its bidding truly, and in which the PA is transformed into the 1990s
version of the Village Leagues. It is at that time that the
Palestinian Gen. Lahad will emerge, or even two Lahads, one
responsible for the West Bank cities and one for Gaza, or a plurality
of Lahads, one responsible for each 'autonomous' area, with no
connection between them except the competition for US and Israeli
favour. It could happen by virtue of "Israeli" intransigence, in which
the PA loses credibility as a national force capable of ever
liberating the West Bank and Gaza Strip through negotiations; this is
the particular track on which history is currently moving.

Given these possibilities, and history (like physics) is all about the
probable realisation of possibilities, a central imperative emerges,
the imperative of a post-Oslo contingency. There must be a contingency
plan by the PLO in case the PA collapses or is altered beyond
recognition. For even if the Palestinian Authority dies, the
Palestinian people must still live. And it must be understood that the
central feature dictating the effectiveness of a contingency plan is
that its preparation must be completed before the historical
inevitability of the projected contingency has become obvious.

To prepare for such a contingency, it is imperative to restore
substance to the PLO structure and not allow the organisation to
become an empty shell. It is not strategically sound to encapsulate
the entire substance of Palestinian existence in the weak and fragile
PA, which exists in a context of an Israeli occupation which surrounds
and imprisons it, and which may someday destroy it; it is more sound
to leave some of the substance in the more independent framework of
the PLO, which is international and not surrounded, and hence, not so
easily destroyed. The PLO can be something larger and higher than the
PA, representing all Palestinians everywhere, inside and outside. 

Also due to the lingering uncertainties, it is important to leave some
of the important PLO figures and cadres on the outside, not only the
PLO foreign minister in Tunis, but also the leaders of the refugee
populations outside. Removing these leaderships to the
inside will do nothing but deprive huge sections of the Palestinian
people of whatever semblance of leadership they have left, to very
little gain, all the while making the PLO even more vulnerable by
bringing all its capable figures and fighting forces under the
jurisdiction of Israel, and within its easy reach. And, in the final
analysis, what kind of leaders would they be, if all of them returned
to Palestine without bringing their people home with them? It only
makes sense for all the outside leaders to return when an
independent state has been declared and the refugees given the
practical option of returning to the territory of such a state.

It is equally imperative to create a structure of survivability within
the PLO organisation something capable of existing if need be in a
post-Oslo or post-PA phase, some phoenix that could rise intact from
the ashes of a fallen, collapsed, or altered PA.

V- The Imperative of Reviving the Military Option

Finally, and I leave this until last to emphasise its importance, the
PLO must never, never give up its military option, either inside or
outside, for this is its only source of leverage.  And by this I do
not refer to the 'threat' of another Intifadah.  After all, the
Intifadah was a unique war in that it was conducted by civilians,
including many children, but today the civilians are tired and cannot
be asked to do such a thing again. Furthermore, "Israel" is not afraid
of another Intifadah, because the new structures of closure and
prevention of normal Palestinian movement do not support
Intifadah-style combat or Intifadah tactics.  Fighting a new Intifadah
is the same as fighting the last war and it will not work. While the
people may do it under instructions, their heart will not be in it.
They are cynical about it because they think it is only for show, and
that they are being asked to sacrifice as civilians simply for
purposes of show.

This means that the military option should be of para-military form
and not civilian form. If there must be a model it should not be that
of the Intifadah; instead it should embody a combination of Hezbollah
and Hamas tactics to be implemented anywhere in the country and not
specifically in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The military option that
should be preserved is of the old style, and I am not saying whether
or not it should be operationalised now or whether it should stand
dormant, only that it is imperative that such structures and
capabilities be quietly constructed and preserved fully intact.

"Israel" does not surrender its military option against the
Palestinians where they live, peace agreement or no peace agreement,
and therefore, what strategic logic dictates that the much weaker
Palestinian side should do so? After all, who ever in world politics
made concessions to a powerless enemy, incapable of violence? The
answer is no one. States do not concede power to others out of
altruism, or because of justice or recognition of rights or any of the
other synonyms for altruism. And it is on this note of calculated
realpolitik that I close [Amin - FAV].

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