The *FREE ARAB VOICE*
March 17, 2001

This issue of the Free Arab Voice (FAV) includes:

1) How To Nurture the Intifada: a FAV Editorial

2) Two New Sections of the Free Arab Voice,
   a Readers' Corner and a Children's Section

3) When National Unity Becomes an Unholy Alliance,
   a critique of the concept of Palestinian Patriotic
   Unity by Hammad Hammad

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1) How Do We Nurture the Intifada? A Free Arab Voice Editorial

The criminal embargo that Zionists have been imposing on Palestinian
communities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the other
atrocious measures against Palestinians, from point blank
assassinations of unarmed rock-throwers and activists to house
demolitions and outright land confiscations, represent only one
level at which the Intifada is besieged today.

There are, in fact, other more subtle, albeit no less dangerous,
sieges on the Intifada that seek to sap its energy and tighten
the noose around it. These include:

1) The Practical Silence of the Arab Lambs: With the exception of
a few token humanitarian and other gestures, the Arab regimes have
generally pursued a policy of countering Zionist aggression with
an abundance of verbosity, especially at the onset of the Intifada.
In the meantime, they crushed the massive pro-Intifada demonstrations
that erupted spontaneously on the Arab street. They never delivered
the financial aid promised at the Arab League Summit in Cairo (with
the exception of Iraq’s earnest attempt at delivering serious aid
which was blocked by the United Nations). Egypt and Jordan did not
sever relations with “Israel”, which could have at least exerted
some political pressure.

When ex-president Clinton launched his initiative to end the Intifada
on the basis of revoking the right of return and giving Palestinians
scraps, on their own land, the Arab state system kept a deadly silence.
Newspaper reports indicated later that at least the Jordanian regime
urged Palestinian negotiators to accept the Clinton Initiative, even
though the effective annulment of the right of return necessarily
implies settling refugees where they currently reside, or in third
countries, of which Jordan is a prime candidate; an issue which
threatens the stability of the Kingdom.

Assuming policy-makers in the Jordanian regime know what they are
doing, it must be noted, nevertheless, that the official Arab silence
on the Clinton Initiative and the lack of effective support for the
Intifada, emanates from a mentality that tackles the question of
Palestine as something that concerns the Palestinians alone.

In the mid-seventies, former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat had
pioneered the approach that dissociates the Arab state system from
its responsibility towards Palestine under the guises of ‘independent
Palestinian decision-making’ and the ‘PLO as the sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people’.

Ever since, the Arab regimes have followed the suit of Sadat, who
was trying to ease his regime’s transition into the pits of Camp
David I. It was all too convenient. ‘We accept what the Palestinians
accept’ was a smooth way for Arab regimes to abandon Palestine and
to deliver it to the invader without having their hands dirtied.
Arafat and his junta, on the other hand, used the flip side of this
approach to justify his descent into Oslo: ‘the Arabs have abandoned us!’,
he often retorted.

In the meantime, he would make ‘independent Palestinian decision-making’
and ‘the sole and legitimate representative’ the most central themes of
his whole political strategy.  But sole and independent representatives
are mainly meant to negotiate.  Freedom fighters would not have been as
preoccupied with the issue of whether or not someone else would be
taking their seat at the negotiating table.  Freedom fighters usually
worry more about proving themselves on the ground, like Hizbullah did.

Based on the above, it stands to reason that any potential success
of the Intifada requires that two items be given high priority on
the agenda of all grass-roots activists who support the Intifada:
a) to redefine the Palestine issue as an Arab responsibility, and
b) to ignite an Intifada on Arab streets as an extension of the
   Palestinian Intifada to force Arab regimes to completely sever
   all relations with the invader, and to eventually open up Arab
   borders to resistance operations, just like in the late sixties
   and early seventies. Mind you, we are not asking Arab regimes
   to go to war. We are only asking them to get off the back of the
   Intifada.

2) The Intifada as a Bargaining Chip: Since the beginning of the Aqsa
Intifada, contacts through clandestine channels, negotiations, open
meetings, and security cooperation with Zionists and the CIA all
contributed to Arafat’s loss of control over the street activities of
the Intifada. Street activists were so disgusted with Arafat’s approach
of using the Intifada as a bargaining chip that they decided to take
things into their own hands, even within the ranks of Fateh, his own
organization. Now the gap between Arafat’s Authority and the Palestinian
masses has reached an all-time high.  He is only trying to ride the waves
to keep himself from becoming marginalized; until he gets a chance to
control the helm and bring the Intifada to a halt as he did with the
first Intifada of 1987-1993, which he buried in the Oslo Agreement.

Yet the principle of compromising the Intifada by using it as a
bargaining chip to improve the terms of the relationship with the
invader, rather than as a means for ending the occupation, has been
embedded in the fundamental mentality of the leadership of the PLO
since the early seventies. It goes along pretty nicely with the
concepts of ‘independent Palestinian decision-making’ and ‘the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ delineated above.
But this is not a mere difference on tactics, for the entire issue
boils down to one question and one question only: does one truly
believe in the liberation of Palestine or not?

Surely, most Palestinian and Arab officials claim to believe in the
liberation of Palestine. But forget the rhetoric that is meant to
placate the masses.  Let the political records speak: how can those
whose deeds and strategies violate the most basic precepts of liberation
struggles throughout history be truly in favor of the liberation of
Palestine?!

Especially after the liberation of South Lebanon, and of the miserable
experience of seven years after Oslo, it is now plain, at least in
political hindsight, what will and what will not work as a strategy for
liberation.

Interestingly enough, even those who mis-apply the experiences of India
and South Africa to the case of Palestine do NOT generally believe that
Arafat’s approach is something they can support. (mis-apply, because the
former two countries did not have the forced evacuation of the majority
of the local population OUTSIDE THE WHOLE COUNTRY, and issues of IDENTITY,
as the central thrust of their colonization, as is the case in Palestine).

It follows then that nurturing the Intifada, requires that two more
items be given high priority on the agenda of grass-roots activists
who support the Intifada: a) how to get rid of Arafat’s leadership,
as weakened as it may be nowadays, and b) how to replace that
leadership, not with another face that carries more or less the
same anti-Palestinian content, but with a radical collective
leadership that embraces armed struggle and the Intifada as the
main tools for achieving liberation.

3) The Hocus Pocus of ‘Palestinian Independence’: Not long ago,
everybody agreed that the strategic objective of any liberation
movement is simply liberation, hence the name Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). It was only through a very roundabout
three-decades long process of inserting the concept of ‘stagism’
into Palestinian political culture, i.e., achieving liberation
in stages, that the strategic objective suddenly became that of
‘an independent state’, somewhere, somehow, by someone...

Granted, liberation might take place in stages. But that only
means that the Naqab Desert might be liberated before the Galil,
or that Haifa might be liberated before Jerusalem. That does not
mean, however, that ‘stagism’ should become our strategic objective,
or that we should recognize the enemy's right to occupy Jerusalem
or any millimeter of Palestine..

In fact, this is not a mere difference over tactics either.
Confusing the strategic objective of the Palestinian patriotic
effort for the ‘declaration of statehood’ or ‘independence’
actually springs from an attempt to fit the aspirations of
Palestinians through the needle hole of colonial objectives
in the region. Instead of doing away with Zionist existence
in Palestine as a colonial base to separate the eastern from
the western parts of the Arab World, a Palestinian state
tailored along Zio-American specifications would be an attempt
to fit right into that mold. The objective here is transformed
strategically from liberation to the creation of another hulk
of an Arab state similar to the other states created in the
Syckes-Picot Agreement of 1916, dividing the Arab east into
various colonial interests.

Some people think this is all that is feasible, so we should
take it. But that only means we are accepting the status quo
as eternal. It means that we have internalized defeat and come
to rationalize it. In the present context, the objectives of
‘statehood’ and what have you basically translate into finding
a place for a stratum of Palestinians in the web of neo-colonial
arrangements for the Arab World. The names of these arrangements
today are many: 'openning up to globalization', ‘Middleasternism’,
‘peace as a strategic objective’, etc... but the end result is
still the same.

Of course there is a section of Palestinians, mostly financiers
and wannabe bureaucrats, who simply want a state, any kind of
state, even if it were declared on an archipelago of sovereign-less
fragments in the West Bank and Gaza. For their own reasons, these
Palestinians are trying to adapt to Zionist and imperialist designs
against the Arab World. They think this is the smart thing to do.
They are even willing to be a bridge between the invader and the
Arab World, in the full sense of the word. Fine!  Just don’t call
that a Palestinian patriotic project, never mind an Arab one. After
all, a Palestinian patriotic project can only be in a perpetual
state of friction with colonial designs in the Arab World, even
if it could not achieve its strategic ends in the short run.
A genuine Palestinian patriotic project must necessarily be
anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. That is the crux of the
matter.

It follows then that the current Intifada is a natural extension
of Palestinian anti-Zionist struggles since the end of the nineteenth
century.  To nurture the Intifada and prevent it from being hijacked
by defeatists and opportunists into the political maze of the
so-called ‘peace process’, grass-roots activists should reaffirm
their commitment to the un-amended Palestinian National Charter.
There you will find the brief on the true strategic objectives
of the Palestinian people, primary among which are: Palestine is
one indivisible whole from sea to sea, and Palestine is an integral
part of the Arab nation. In short, Palestine is Arab.

Free Arab Voice/ editor

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2) Two New Sections of the Free Arab Voice:

a - The Free Arab Voice editorial board (Nabila Harb, Maha Abu Ghosh,
Ziad el Jishi, Tawfic Abdul Fattah, and Ibrahim Alloush) has resolved
to open up part of FAV's website for unedited articles, comments, and
poems by readers under the title of READERS' CORNER. To check out the
new section, please go to: http://www.fav.net/readersCorner.htm

You shall find there an article on Anti-Normalization by Adel Samara,
and a poem by Samir Taha.  More is on the way.. If you would like to
have your comments published in the Readers' Corner, please indicate
as much.

b - Under the supervision of writer Nabila Harb, the only mother on the
board of FAV, a new Children's Section is being started on our website
as you can see from FAV's main page. If interested in contributing,
please email Nabila@fav.net. Check out FAV's main page as well, under
the Children's Section, to learn about the Free Palestine Coloring Book,
dedicated to the children of the Intifada by Fayeq Oweis.

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3) When National Unity Becomes an Unholy Alliance, by Hammad Hammad

Having lived through Palestinian Politics for many years, we have
all noticed calls for National Unity being raised from time to
time. As one reflects back on the past three decades, one cannot
help but wonder what common conditions existed when those calls
had arisen. The only common ground to be found (within those 30
years) is an upcoming sale for which the cover of legitimacy is
needed.

It is important to understand the Palestinian psyche in order to
appreciate the strength of the National Unity call. Because of
shared misery, oppression, and Diaspora, the bond between
Palestinians is stronger than that among the rest of the Arab
world. While many Palestinian intellectuals have freed themselves
of that narrow Palestinian outlook, such attitude still prevails
throughout the Palestinian street. Hence, the general public sees
division and fighting among different Palestinian factions as a major
political sin. National Unity becomes a soft point in the heart of
the street; a call which Palestinians cannot ignore.

This bond was exploited time and over again by Arafat to pass
off his agenda, discredit his opponents, and make certain they
lose all kind of popular support despite their patriotic backgrounds.
It was utilized in the seventies to squash various movements that
stood against his dictatorial methods. It was also used in 1983 to
brand those who “mutinied” against him as Syrian agents who wanted
to give away “independent Palestinian decision-making”. In 1988,
Arafat was able to split his opposition by bringing to his side
the PFLP and the DFLP and many other smaller organizations in the
name of National Unity (as a matter of fact, the PNC conference
in Algeria that year was named the Conference of National Unity.).

The same scenario was replayed again when he insured a hero-like
entry into Gaza and the West Bank in 1993 by duping Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad into submission. In 1998, the call for National Unity
brought the PFLP and the DFLP, which had been alienated by the
signing of the Oslo Accord, back to Arafat's lap.

So, what were the consequences of all those calls for National
Unity?

In the Seventies, Arafat was able to speak to the UN in the name
of all the Palestinians, when he mentioned his olive branch for
the first time. He also got the Arab world to recognize the PLO
as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
(which turned out to be a huge setback to the Arab cause, and an
excuse for Sadat and the Arab regimes to abandon the Palestinian
cause).

In 1983, he made his first trip to Egypt after the signing of Camp
David. His trip to Egypt, after he had left Tripoli, Lebanon, was
an indication of things to come. The PLO was getting farther and
farther away from the battlefield.

In 1987 and 1988, he was able to bestow a certain degree of
legitimacy on his newly-declared “State in Exile”, which was
based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 (hence signing off 78% of
Palestine.). He was also able to jump into the control of the
United Intifada Leadership (which was formed in the name of National
Unity to face the enemy), thus bringing the uprising to a screeching
halt in 1993 after having acquired thereof the agency to speak for
and to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians.

In 1993, he was able to convince the ever-popular Hamas and
Islamic Jihad not to take any measures against him and his
cronies, as they were their Palestinian brethren! Hamas even
issued a religious edict declaring fighting among Palestinians
a sin. Once he had set his dogs in place, Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad were thrown in the same dungeons that the Zionists had
relinquished to Arafat.

Finally, in 1998, a similar call for National Unity brought some
of the opposition scurrying back to join him and “to oppose from
within”. This enabled him to hold his PNC conference in Gaza and
to obliterate the Palestinian national charter altogether. Mind
you, opposing from within still endows Arafat with the right to
speak out for that LOYAL opposition.

Today, we hear the exact same call coming from the West Bank
and Gaza. This time, it is a call for national unity to face
the enemy, yet again, in the current Intifada. The opposition
is called upon to share leadership with Fateh and the PA in order
to ward off any attempts to destroy the latest movement. So, what’s
for sale now? It will be interesting to see if the opposition has
learned its lessons: that the enemy from within is much more
dangerous. It is fairly easy to give in to emotion with the great
sacrifices of the Palestinian people set in the background, but it
is important for the opposition to realize that no one has ever
achieved anything of consequence by succumbing to emotion; that
all sacrifices would be wasted if they allow Arafat to take control,
and to claim the representation of Palestinians again.

Two questions need to be answered by Fateh before any of the
opposition even starts to think of coordinating with them
politically:

1. Did Arafat repent?
2. Did Fateh get rid of Arafat’s leadership?

The obvious answer to all of the above is NO. Arafat is clearly
still committed to his old line. Many people tend to get fooled
by a new mantra Arafat’s machine is playing: “Oslo is dead, let’s
move on.” No one can claim that they heard Arafat or any of his
crew say that. It is Fateh that is repeating that mantra. And it
is important to realize that Fateh submits to Arafat, not the other
way around. Anything they say is worthless compared to what is heard
from their boss. To coordinate political decision-making with Fateh
and the PA will be akin to giving Arafat the keys to the Intifada;
and his main priority is to turn the switch off. Of course,
coordinating with Fateh rank-and-file activists on the field who
help fuel an Intifada Arafat can’t control is one thing. Surrendering
political decision-making to Arafat in the name of National Unity,
on the other hand, will kill the Intifada.

The word “National” in National Unity is an erroneous translation
of the Arabic word “Wataniyah”, which in this context actually
means Patriotic.

Any Patriotic Unity must be based on patriotic principles or it
will be nothing but an Unholy Alliance. As the old proverb goes:
“May God save me from my friends. As for my enemies, I can take
care of them.”

Hammad Hammad
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